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Chapter 1 
Introduction and background 
1.1 On 30 October 2014, the Senate referred the matter of privatisation of state 
and territory assets and new infrastructure to the Economics References Committee 
for inquiry and report by 2 March 2015. On 2 December 2014, the Senate granted an 
extension to the committee to report by 20 March 2015. In particular, the committee 
was to examine:  
Incentives to privatise state or territory assets and recycle the proceeds into new 
infrastructure, with particular reference to: 
(a) the role of the Commonwealth in working with states and territories to 
fund nation-building infrastructure, including 
(i) the appropriateness of the Commonwealth providing funding, and 
(ii) the capacity of the Commonwealth to contribute an additional 
15 per cent, or alternative amounts, of reinvested sale proceeds; 
(b) the economics of incentives to privatise assets; 
(c) what safeguards would be necessary to ensure any privatisations were in 
the interests of the state or territory, the Commonwealth and the public; 
(d) the process for evaluating potential projects and for making 
recommendations about grants payments, including the application of 
cost-benefit analyses and measurement of productivity and other 
benefits; 
(e) parliamentary scrutiny; 
(f) alternative mechanisms for funding infrastructure development in states 
and territories; 
(g) equity impacts between states and territories arising from 
Commonwealth incentives for future asset sales; and 
(h) any related matter.1 
Conduct of inquiry 
1.2 The committee advertised its inquiry on its website and in the Australian. The 
committee also wrote directly to the Commonwealth, state and territory governments 
and other stakeholders, drawing attention to the inquiry and inviting them to make 
written submissions.  
1.3 The committee received 37 submissions, which are listed at Appendix 1. The 
committee held public hearings in Darwin on 16 February 2015 and in Sydney on 
1  Journals of the Senate, No. 63, 30 October 2014, p. 1704; Journals of the Senate, No. 72, 
2 December 2014, p. 1940. 
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18 February 2015. The committee thanks all those who assisted with the inquiry, 
especially those who made written submissions. 
Background to inquiry 
1.4 The National Commission of Audit report Towards Responsible Government, 
was published in two parts in February and March 2014. The report noted that after 
privatisation of a number of public assets from 1990 through to 2006, privatisation 
activity at the federal level has remained largely dormant since this time.  In contrast, 
state and territory privatisation activities have increased since 2006.2  
1.5 On 28 March 2014, the Treasurer, the Hon Joe Hockey MP, announced an 
Asset Recycling Initiative (the Initiative), proposing that the Commonwealth would 
offer substantial financial incentives to states and territories to sell assets and recycle 
the proceeds of those sales into new infrastructure. The Initiative would cover 
transactions negotiated between the states and the Commonwealth until 30 June 2016, 
and offer incentive payments of 15 per cent of the assessed value of the asset being 
sold (or leased) through to 30 June 2019.3 
1.6 On 2 May 2014 the Commonwealth, states and territories confirmed their 
commitment to the National Partnership Agreement on Asset Recycling (NPAAR). 
The NPAAR is intended to:  
• assist in addressing state and territory funding constraints that limit their 
ability to invest in additional economic infrastructure; and 
• contribute to increased investment in productivity-enhancing infrastructure by 
encouraging the sale of state-owned assets to unlock funds and recycle the 
capital into additional infrastructure.4 
1.7 To provide financial assistance to the states and territories, the 2014–15 
Federal Budget included an Infrastructure Growth Package and stated an intention to 
establish an Asset Recycling Fund of approximately $5.9 billion, by combining 
2  National Commission of Audit, Towards Responsible Government, Phase One, February 2014, 
p. xiv, 220–221. 
3  The Hon Joe Hockey MP, Treasurer, Treasurers agree to boost infrastructure, Media release, 
28 March 2014. 
4  Council of Australia Governments, National Partnership Agreement on Asset Recycling, 
2 May 2014, p. 2. 
 
                                              
 Page 3 
uncommitted funds from the Building Australia Fund5 and the Education Investment 
Fund.6 These funds were intended to be available from 1 July 2014.7  
The Bill and the operation of the Asset Recycling Initiative 
1.8 On 29 May 2014 the Asset Recycling Fund Bill 2014 (the Bill) and the Asset 
Recycling Fund (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2014 were introduced into the 
House of Representatives to establish an Asset Recycling Fund that would:  
• enable grants of financial assistance to be made to the states and territories for 
expenditure incurred under the National Partnership Agreements on Asset 
Recycling and Land Transport Infrastructure Projects;  
• make infrastructure national partnership grants; and  
• enable the making of infrastructure payments.8  
1.9 The Bill was debated and amended by both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate. On 17 July 2014 the House of Representatives disagreed with 
approximately half of the Senate's amendments, including amendments 21, 23, 28 and 
31 which would require that Infrastructure Australia evaluate large projects and 
publicly disclose a cost-benefit analysis under some circumstances. On 18 July 2014 
the Senate voted to insist on the amendments. At the time of preparation of this report 
the Bill remains before the House of Representatives.9  
1.10 Despite the introduction of the Bill, the committee understands that the 
Commonwealth may not require legislation to make incentive payments to the states 
and territories, and that this could be offered under existing legislation. Treasury 
informed the committee that the Asset Recycling Initiative is able to proceed even if 
the Bill is not passed: 
The Commonwealth is currently able to make the incentive payments to the 
states and territories under the framework established by the Federal 
Financial Relations Act 2009. This is the same framework for making 
5  The Building Australia Fund was established in 2009 to to finance capital investment in 
transport infrastructure (such as roads, rail, urban transport and ports), communications 
infrastructure (such as broadband), energy infrastructure and water infrastructure; 
http://www.finance.gov.au/investment-funds/NBF/BAF.html, (accessed 5 march 2015). 
6  The Education Investment Fund was established in 2008 to provide funding for projects that 
create or develop significant infrastructure in higher education, research and vocational 
education and training institutions; https://www.education.gov.au/education-investment-fund, 
(accessed 5 march 2015). 
7  Australian Government, Budget 2014–15, Budget Measure, Budget Paper No. 2, 13 May 2014, 
p. 114 
8  House of Representatives, Votes and Proceedings, No. 41, 29 May 2014, p. 515; Asset 
Recycling Fund Bill 2014, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 4. 
9  Asset Recycling Fund Bill 2014, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?
bId=r5255, (accessed 5 February 2015); Schedule of amendments made by the Senate to which 
the House of Representatives has disagreed. (accessed 5 February 2015). 
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payments under other National Partnership Agreements with the states and 
territories.10 
Operation of the Asset Recycling Initiative 
1.11  The committee understands that there is demand for new investment in high-
quality infrastructure across Australia11 to support economic growth and create jobs in 
the short to medium term, and to deliver higher productivity in the longer term.12 
1.12 The Treasury submission described how the Asset Recycling Initiative would 
operate. The Commonwealth would make an incentive payment equal to 15 per cent 
of the proceeds from an asset divestment, only if the state or territory government 
reinvests these proceeds13 and the incentive payment into additional infrastructure.14  
1.13 The Treasury submission also indicated that the terms of each bilateral 
agreement between the Commonwealth and an individual state or territory is stated in 
a schedule to the National Partnership Agreement that is made public.15 Funding to 
individual states and territories is allocated on a first-come, first-served basis within 
the following timeframes:16 
• the asset divestment must be completed by, and the construction of the 
additional infrastructure must commence by 30 June 2019;17 
• once a schedule has been agreed, incentive payments would be made in two 
instalments subject to satisfying specific agreed criteria; and 
• before a state or territory is entitled to an incentive payment, it must report 
against the specific agreed criteria by providing the Commonwealth with a 
Statement of Assurance.18 
10  Treasury, Submission 28, p. 14. 
11  Infrastructure is the basic physical and organisation structures and facilities needed for the 
operation of a society or enterprise. It includes roads, bridges, tunnels, water systems, sewers, 
electricity grids, telecommunication systems, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/infrastructure, (accessed 6 March 2015). 
12  Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, The Asset Recycling Initiative, 
http://investment.infrastructure.gov.au/publications/reports/pdf/factsheets2014/Factsheet_The_
Asset_Recycling_Initiative.pdf, (accessed 5 March 2015). 
13  Treasury, Submission 28, p. 13; Council of Australia Governments, National Partnership 
Agreement on Asset Recycling, 2 May 2014, Clause 19. 
14  Treasury, Submission 28, p. 13; Council of Australia Governments, National Partnership 
Agreement on Asset Recycling, 2 May 2014, Clauses 18, 19. 
15  Treasury, Submission 28, p. 13; Council of Australia Governments, National Partnership 
Agreement on Asset Recycling, 2 May 2014, Clause 22. 
16  Treasury, Submission 28, p. 13; Council of Australia Governments, National Partnership 
Agreement on Asset Recycling, 2 May 2014, Clause 15. 
17  Treasury, Submission 28, p. 13; Council of Australia Governments, National Partnership 
Agreement on Asset Recycling, 2 May 2014, Clause 15. 
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1.14 If a state or territory does not proceed with the divestment of an asset or the 
construction of additional infrastructure in accordance with the terms of the bilateral 
agreement, the state or territory would be required to repay incentive payments it has 
received. In such circumstances, the funds may be reallocated to other projects under 
the National Partnership Agreement.19 
Productivity Commission inquiry into Public Infrastructure 
1.15 The Productivity Commission inquiry into Public Infrastructure was initiated 
on 13 November 2013 and was tasked with:  
• investigating costs, competitiveness and productivity in the provision of 
nationally significant economic infrastructure;  
• examining ways to address any barriers to private sector financing, including 
assessing the role and efficacy of alternative infrastructure funding and 
financing mechanisms; and  
• recommending mechanisms and operating principles to overcome such 
barriers and reduce infrastructure construction costs.20 
1.16 The Public Infrastructure inquiry ran for six months, receiving over 200 
submissions, and taking evidence from over 40 witnesses and making more than 30 
findings and recommendations. The final report of the inquiry was completed on 
27 May 2014 and published on 14 July 2014.  
1.17 In November 2014 the government responded to the report’s 
recommendations, noting that the findings covered five themes: 
• reforms to institutional and governance arrangements, including greater 
transparency of the economic assessment of public infrastructure proposals 
and tying Commonwealth funding to the implementation of good governance 
principles;  
• improvements to project planning and prioritisation;  
• governments to consider various public and private financing models, 
including broader application of ‘user charging’ for infrastructure services and 
new models of road infrastructure project selection and funding;  
• improvements to project delivery in order to reduce costs; and  
• achieving more productive labour and construction markets through 
reforms, including reforms similar to those underway by the Commonwealth 
18  Treasury, Submission 28, p. 14; Council of Australia Governments, National Partnership 
Agreement on Asset Recycling, 2 May 2014, Clause 32. 
19  Treasury, Submission 28, p. 14; Council of Australia Governments, National Partnership 
Agreement on Asset Recycling, 2 May 2014, Clause 23. 
20  Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry report, No. 71, 27 May 2014, p. v. 
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to review the industrial relations and occupational health and safety 
accreditation schemes.21 
1.18 The Productivity Commission indicated that it was important to reform 
governance and institutional arrangements for public infrastructure to promote better 
decision making in project selection, funding, financing and the delivery of services 
from new and existing infrastructure.22  
1.19 The Productivity Commission also noted that private sector involvement in 
infrastructure development and/or financing would only deliver efficiency gains with 
careful planning and implementation – it is not a ‘magic pudding’. Government 
guarantees and tax concessions would still involve both risks and costs, and 
ultimately, it is the users and/or taxpayers who will absorb these.23 
1.20 The Productivity Commission inquiry into Public Infrastructure recommended 
that privatisation should be subject to appropriate procedural scrutiny to ensure that 
the public interest is protected through structural separation, regulation, sale 
conditions and 'community service obligations'.24 The inquiry also recommended that 
Commonwealth financial assistance to states and territories should only be provided 
where there is clear evidence of a net public benefit from the project that would 
otherwise not be obtainable without Australian Government support.25 
1.21 The committee considers that the Productivity Commission report identifies 
very important issues that should guide any future assistance to states and territories 
seeking to divest public assets. 
 
21  Productivity Commission Inquiry report into Public Infrastructure, Government Response, 
November 2014,  
22  Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry report, No. 71, 27 May 2014, p. 2. 
23  Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry report, No. 71, 27 May 2014, p. 2. 
24  Community service obligations are common and exist for a number of utilities, including 
current and former government business enterprises. For example, Australia Post has statutory 
community service obligations as part of its customer service charter, which require it to 
provide an accessible letter service at a single uniform rate within Australia for standard letters, 
http://auspost.com.au/about-us/customer-service-charter.html, (accessed 16 March 2015). 
25  Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry report, No. 71, 27 May 2014, p. 40. 
 
                                              
  
 
Chapter 2 
Linking infrastructure funding to privatisation 
2.1 During this inquiry the committee focussed its attention on the link between 
infrastructure funding and privatisation under the Asset Recycling Initiative, which 
provides states and territories with financial incentives if they sell assets and recycle 
the capital into additional infrastructure.
1
  
2.2 While the committee was aware of some support for the Asset Recycling 
Initiative,
2
 the majority of submitters and witnesses identified a range of concerns and 
did not support the Initiative. This chapter discusses the issues that may arise from 
binding infrastructure funding to privatisation under the Asset Recycling Initiative, 
with a specific focus on the: 
 potential distortion of state and territory decisions on privatisation and 
infrastructure funding; 
 possibility that privatisation decisions will be rushed, leading to poor 
processes, poor consultation and poor regulatory safeguards; and 
 potential unfairness and inequity between the states and territories.  
Distortion of decisions 
2.3 The committee has considered evidence that binding infrastructure funding 
with privatisation has the potential to distort state and territory decisions on 
privatisation and infrastructure funding. The potentially undesirable outcomes of this 
distortion may include: 
 privatisation of assets that would not otherwise be privatised; 
 negative impact on states and territory revenues by selling revenue earning 
assets to purchase loss making infrastructure; and 
 distorting the consideration of a range of more appropriate infrastructure 
funding mechanisms by states and territories. 
  
                                              
1  Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, The Asset Recycling Initiative, 
http://investment.infrastructure.gov.au/publications/reports/pdf/factsheets2014/Factsheet_The_
Asset_Recycling_Initiative.pdf, (accessed 3 March 2014). 
2  Australia Logistics Council, Submission 12, pp 4–6; Australian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, Submission 13, p. 7; Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, Submission 
11, p. 2. 
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Distortion of privatisation decisions 
2.4 Economist Mr Stephen Koukoulas informed the committee that in his view, 
the Asset Recycling Initiative introduces a market distortion that could lead to poor 
privatisation decisions: 
…it is interesting that none of these assets have been sold until this bonus, 
or incentive…has been offered. Presumably all of a sudden these assets are 
not more valuable—arguably, in a low inflation environment with a very 
subdued rate of economic growth, they are worth less today than they were 
some time ago. 
…if anybody offered me 15 per cent more for anything, I would be very 
tempted to sell it whether I wanted to or not because I know I would be able 
to do something else with the money.
3
 
2.5 Professor John Quiggin informed the committee that the Asset Recycling 
Initiative could distort both privatisation decisions and infrastructure investment 
decisions: 
The implication is that that (a) privatisation decision must be marginal. 
Obviously, if we were in a situation where state government had an asset 
which it held as a substantial premium product it would not need the 
subsidy program to make that decision. So, what we are seeing, as with 
most subsidies, is bad decisions. In this case, bad privatisation decisions are 
being encouraged by the presence of the subsidy. The fact that you cannot 
get it for a privatisation that makes such strong economic sense and for 
which you do not need the subsidy is an indication of exactly how things 
are being distorted on both sides of the decision. Regarding both the assets 
originally for sale and secondary investments, this program distorts both of 
those decisions.
4
 
2.6 Mr Mark Lennon, Secretary of Unions NSW and Mr Adam Kerslake, of the 
'Stop the Sell Off' campaign supported the view that the Asset Recycling Initiative 
was distorting the market.
5
  Professor Quiggin asserted that policy should be based on 
cost-benefit analysis of projects and should not be driven by the Asset Recycling 
Initiative.
6
 
  
                                              
3  Mr Stephen Koukoulas, Managing Director, Market Economics, Committee Hansard, 
18 February 2015, p. 9. 
4  Professor John Quiggin, Committee Hansard, 18 February 2015, p. 23. 
5  Mr Mark Lennon, Secretary of Unions NSW, Committee Hansard, 18 February 2015, p. 32; 
Mr Adam Kerslake, Director, Stop the Sell Off campaign, Committee Hansard, 18 February 
2015, p. 35. 
6  Professor John Quiggin, Australian Research Council Laureate Fellow, University of 
Queensland, Committee Hansard, 18 February 2015, p. 23. 
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2.7 The distorting effect of the Asset Recycling Initiative was confirmed by the 
Treasury submission which indicates that states and territories are required to show 
that the decision to divest an asset must have been significantly influenced by the 
Initiative in order to qualify for incentive payments.7  
2.8 In its May 2014 report on Public Infrastructure, the Productivity Commission 
offered this blunt comment on binding privatisation with new infrastructure projects 
through capital recycling: 
Privatisation has been raised by participants in this inquiry mainly in the 
context of ‘capital recycling’ — that is, selling existing infrastructure assets 
and using the proceeds to finance new infrastructure projects. The 
Commission’s view is that privatisation should only occur when it is in the 
community’s interests in its own right, as a tool to improve efficiency. 
What is done with the proceeds is essentially a separate issue. Linking the 
two issues through capital recycling may help to build community support 
for privatisation, but there are also risks.
8
 
2.9 The Productivity Commission also confirmed that one of the greatest risks 
from the capital recycling model is the potential for it to distort infrastructure funding 
decisions. The Productivity Commission argued that:  
…an arrangement where the proceeds of sale are automatically 
hypothecated to investment in new infrastructure projects may create risks 
for over-investment in new greenfields infrastructure which, by its nature, 
typically involves significant risks in the early construction and operational 
phases.
9
 
2.10 Another problem with capital recycling identified by the Productivity 
Commission is that it could possibly create a public perception that the only time an 
asset should be privatised is if there is some new infrastructure project in which to 
invest.
10
 
Compensation for tax equivalent payments 
2.11 The Water Services Association of Australia noted that corporatised 
government owned businesses contribute two revenue streams to state and territory 
governments. The first revenue stream that state and territory governments receive is 
dividends from the profits made by the business. The second revenue stream is the tax 
equivalent payments under the National Tax Equivalence Regime, which are the 
income tax payments that an equivalent private company would pay to the 
Commonwealth government. If such a corporatised entity or its assets are sold by a 
                                              
7  Treasury, Submission 28, p. 15. 
8  Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry report, No. 71, May 2014, p. 88. 
9  Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry report, No. 71, May 2014, p. 262. 
10  Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry report, No. 71, May 2014, p. 262. 
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state or territory government, that government will no longer receive either revenue 
stream.
11
 
2.12 The committee heard evidence that the Initiative could be considered as a way 
of compensating states and territories for the possible loss of revenues from tax 
equivalent payments.
12
 This was dismissed by Treasury, with Mr Chris Legg stating 
that the 15 per cent payment 'is an incentive, and that is all it is. It is a figure that 
emerged from negotiations with the states. It is high enough to be seen as meaningful 
to them and low enough for us to see it as an economical way of achieving the desired 
outcome.'
13
 
2.13 However the Productivity Commission questioned whether there was a need 
to offer any incentives at all to the states and territories:  
Whether the State and Territory Governments have a financial disincentive 
to privatise their infrastructure assets that needs to be compensated by the 
Australian Government is debatable. Several factors, such as dividend 
imputation and productivity gains from privatisation could offset the loss of 
notional income tax payments. Specifically, if dividend imputation is 
complete and the purchaser of the enterprise can obtain full compensation 
of company tax through franking credits, a State Government would not 
lose from privatisation. Furthermore, if the purchaser is able to operate the 
enterprise more productively, the price they pay would reflect some of that 
gain. The State Government would then receive a premium over the 
(capitalised) revenue stream that would have vested with the government, if 
the asset stayed in public hands.
14
 
Impact on revenues 
2.14 This section discusses the committee's consideration of concerns raised about 
the potential impact of the Asset Recycling Initiative on revenues to governments that 
decide to sell income-generating assets to fund infrastructure that will not generate 
income.
15
  
2.15 Asset recycling could involve using proceeds from the sale of existing income 
generating assets to fund new income generating infrastructure. However, it is entirely 
possible that a state or territory could divest itself of a revenue generating asset and 
use the proceeds on activities that do not generate income. Professor John Quiggin 
advised the committee that:  
                                              
11  Water Services Association of Australia, Submission 10, p. 4. 
12  Water Service Association of Australia, Submission 10, p. 5; Association of Superannuation 
Funds of Australia, Submission 11, p. 2. 
13  Mr Chris Legg, Chief Adviser, Industries and Infrastructure Division, Department of the 
Treasury, Committee Hansard, 20 February 2015, p. 42. 
14  Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry report, No. 71, May 2014, p. 263. 
15  Community and Public Sector Union, Submission 2, p. 1; Stop the Sell Off,  Submission 23, 
p. 2. 
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Income-generating assets are valuable precisely because they generate 
income. Selling the assets and spending the proceeds on current or capital 
items that generate no flow of income, and cannot be justified by ordinary 
cost-benefit analysis is not, in any meaningful sense, recycling.
16
 
2.16 The Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) and representatives from 
the ‘Stop the Sell Off’ campaign raised concerns that if income generating assets such 
as electricity networks are sold and the proceeds are used to fund non-income 
generating assets such as roads, the reduction in long-term income will make it harder 
to raise the revenue necessary to sustainably fund additional infrastructure and public 
services in the future.
17
 
2.17 The committee understands that the NSW government is proposing to sell the 
state’s electricity transmission and distribution assets. The McKell Institute report 
notes that these make significant, stable, and low-risk contributions to annual state 
revenues: 
The $1.7B that the NSW Government earned from the network last year 
was equal to over 25% of payroll tax, 30% of transfer duties, and nearly 
90% of taxes on gambling and betting.
18
 
2.18 The committee does not intend to conduct a financial analysis of the proposed 
sale of 49 per cent the NSW electricity transmission networks. However, the 
committee notes that the predicted sale price of $20B proposed by the NSW 
government has been questioned by experts who have suggested that a more likely 
value for the transaction is $11B.
19
 
2.19 Submitters and witnesses noted that federal, state and territory governments 
are presently operating under significant fiscal constraints.
20
  
2.20 Mr Koukoulas advised the committee that in his view, retaining income 
generating assets can make an important contribution to government budgets: 
…you do run into the problem that, having had a look at the score sheet of 
asset sales over the last 20-something years…You can only sell these assets 
once, of course, and in the meantime you have got to rely on other sources 
                                              
16  Professor John Quiggin, Submission 21, p. 8. 
17  Community and Public Sector Union, Submission 2, p. 1; Stop the Sell Off, Submission 23, 
p. 2. 
18  Stephen Koukoulas and Thomas Devlin, The McKell Institute, Nothing to gain, plenty to lose: 
Why the government, households and businesses could end up paying a high price for 
electricity privatisation, December 2014, p. 6. 
19  Stephen Koukoulas and Thomas Devlin, The McKell Institute, Nothing to gain, plenty to lose: 
Why the government, households and businesses could end up paying a high price for 
electricity privatisation, December 2014, pp 16, 54. 
20  Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Submission 13, p. 8; Australian Services 
Union, Submission 15, p. 5; Business Council of Australia, Submission 22, p. 3; Mr Chris Legg, 
Chief Adviser, Industries and Infrastructure Division, Department of the Treasury, Committee 
Hansard, 18 February 2015, p. 43. 
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of revenue. Again, this has arguably been the problem over the last five to 
10 years. We are having a debate about, dare I say it, the GST, Medicare 
co-payments and all these things that are designed to get towards a balanced 
budget, because there is nothing much else that is generating the revenue. It 
is a bit more complex than that, but that is the broad sense of it. So we do 
need some income generating assets for the government sector to be able to 
get close to balancing its budget.
21
 
2.21 The Productivity Commission noted that the net impact of capital recycling on 
the government’s balance sheet remains unclear, and may even create additional long 
term liabilities:  
In effect, a government would be swapping ownership of a mature asset 
(with known demand and cost characteristics), with ownership of a new 
(and potentially more risky) greenfields asset (with often unknown demand 
and cost characteristics). While government is receiving revenue from the 
asset sale and avoiding future liabilities (including any contingent 
liabilities), it would also lose access to the future revenue stream from that 
asset (be it from dividends or otherwise) and be exposed to a new set of 
assets and liabilities with less reliable estimates of dividends and other 
revenue. 
Ultimately, poorly conceived decisions to link asset sales to new 
infrastructure investments could in fact have a negative future balance sheet 
impact and create long term additional liabilities for government.
22
 
Greenfield versus brownfield assets 
2.22 Some submitters argued in favour of the Asset Recycling Initiative on the 
basis that while government is often better placed to manage the demand risks 
associated with the early stages of greenfield projects,
 
 the private sector is often better 
placed to efficiently operate brownfield
23
 assets that have a steady revenue stream.
24
 
The implication of the above being that mature brownfield assets should be sold and 
the money invested into new greenfield infrastructure. 
2.23 In his submission to the Productivity Commission inquiry into Public 
Infrastructure, Professor Henry Ergas argued that the same factors that lead to private 
investors being risk averse towards major new projects with substantial cost and 
demand uncertainty should also lead the public sector to be wary of those projects. 
                                              
21  Mr Stephen Koukoulas, Managing Director, Market Economics, Committee Hansard, 
18 February 2015, p. 12. 
22  Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry report, No. 71, May 2014, p. 264. 
23  A ‘brownfield’ investment opportunity is one that involves the sale or re-development of an 
asset which already has an operating history. This is in contrast to a ‘greenfield’ project, which 
involves the development of a new project without an operating history and which typically 
also involves construction risk, http://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/insights/legal-
briefings/new-or-recycled-predicting-the-pipeline-of-super-investment-in-infrastructure,  
(accessed 11 March 2015). 
24  Business Council of Australia, Submission 22, p. 3; Treasury, Submission 28, p. 10. 
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In short, ‘asset recycling’ should not be used as an excuse to inefficiently 
shift risk on to taxpayers. If projects are inherently risky – because their 
cost and demand characteristics are uncertain in ways that cannot be hedged 
through diversification, and/or their likely net returns fluctuate with 
aggregate incomes – then transferring their funding to the public sector 
cannot in itself eliminate that risk or reduce its costs. That makes it all the 
more important to ensure proper project evaluation, along with the other 
safeguards discussed above.
25
 
Alternative funding mechanisms 
2.24 The committee considered evidence on whether binding privatisation with 
infrastructure funding may distort the way states and territories consider other forms 
of funding including taxes, borrowing, user charges, and Commonwealth grants. 
2.25 Mr Koukoulas made the following observations, questioning the 
appropriateness of binding infrastructure funding with privatisation under the Asset 
Recycling Initiative: 
 if the private sector thought it was profitable within the existing regulatory 
environment for them to build infrastructure, they would do it; and  
 if it is worthwhile undertaking public infrastructure spending, it should be 
done regardless of whether there is asset recycling or whether interest rates 
are high or low; it should be based on need and not any other incentive.
26
 
2.26 The Productivity Commission noted that a further potential risk is that the 
availability of funds from privatisation may mute or distort the incentives for state 
governments to properly consider how user charges could be used to fund new 
infrastructure. It also noted that capital recycling could prevent funds from being 
directed to higher value uses, which may not necessarily be new infrastructure 
investment.
27
 
2.27 Many witnesses noted that public sector debt is currently relatively 
inexpensive and suggested that governments should take advantage of current low 
borrowing rates for infrastructure funding.
28
 In his submission to the Productivity 
Commission inquiry into Public Infrastructure, Professor Henry Ergas argued that the 
public sector cost of debt does not reflect the cost to tax payers of making funding 
available: 
…current bond rates do not reflect an unusually low social cost of risk but 
rather the opposite: individual savers demand a higher than usual premium 
                                              
25  Professor Henry Ergas, Productivity Commission Public Infrastructure inquiry, Submission 87, 
p. 17. 
26  Mr Stephen Koukoulas, Managing Director, Market Economics, Committee Hansard, 
18 February 2015, pp 8–11. 
27  Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry report, No. 71, May 2014, p. 262. 
28  Mr David Richardson, Senior Research Fellow, The Australia Institute, Committee Hansard, 
18 February 2015, p. 5; Mr Stephen Koukoulas, Managing Director, Market Economics, 
Committee Hansard, 18 February 2015, p. 11. 
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to bear risk. There is no reason to believe taxpayers differ from savers in 
that respect.
29
 
…it is the cost to taxpayers of making funding available, not the public 
sector cost of debt, that must be used. That cost to taxpayers is unlikely to 
be below the private sector cost of capital, except where the public sector 
has access to risk-pooling opportunities unavailable to the private sector. 
Moreover, because taxes distort economic activity, the cost of those 
distortions must be fully accounted for in assessing the projects that are 
being considered for funding.
30
 
Rushed privatisation 
2.28 This section discusses the committee's consideration of the potential for 
binding infrastructure funding and privatisation to create incentives to needlessly rush 
decisions without establishing appropriate corporate structures, safeguards and 
regulatory arrangements, or undertaking public consultation or cost-benefit analysis. 
2.29 In its inquiry into Public Infrastructure the Productivity Commission 
commented on Australia's experience with privatisation. These comments highlight 
some of the important steps for privatisation to be successful: 
As in many countries, Australia’s experience with privatisation has been 
mixed. A key lesson is that the structure of the industry and relevant 
markets should be well defined prior to any privatisation, and the method 
chosen to privatise assets should be designed to maximise net benefits to 
the community. Practices designed to reach inflated sale prices are rarely 
successful, can disadvantage further efforts at privatisation and lead to an 
overall net cost to the community over the long term.
31
 
Above all, privatisation should be undertaken not for its own sake, but to 
achieve a more efficient outcome for the community at large.
32
 
  
                                              
29  Professor Henry Ergas, Productivity Commission Public Infrastructure inquiry, Submission 87, 
p. 17. 
30  Professor Henry Ergas, Productivity Commission Public Infrastructure inquiry, Submission 87, 
p. 17. 
31  Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry report, No. 71, May 2014, p. 63. 
32  Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry report, No. 71, May 2014, p. 64. 
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Consultation and public disclosure 
2.30 A common concern identified by many submitters and witnesses was the lack 
of public disclosure of the benefits and costs of privatisation, including transaction 
costs, retained liabilities and regulatory costs associated with privatisation.
33
 
2.31 In the Northern Territory, the committee repeatedly heard concerns about a 
lack of public consultation in relation to the privatisation of the Territory Insurance 
Office (TIO) and other assets in the Northern Territory.
34
 The Northern Territory 
opposition raised concerns about privatisation of assets being rushed and the lack of 
public debate that occurred about the sale when compared to other jurisdictions.
35
  
2.32 The Hon Delia Lawrie MLA asserted that TIO was sold without public 
consultation on the merits of the sale and with a lack of real scrutiny.
36
 United 
Voice NT raised related concerns in its submission.
37
 Independent MLA Mr Gerry 
Wood informed the committee that: 
In the Territory, unfortunately, I think the big issue in relation to the sale of 
assets has been (1) the lack of consultation with the people and (2) the lack 
of consultation even with parliament. A classic example would be the 
recent sale of TIO.  
…the real issue was that the government did not take the issue to the people 
to put their case in an open way so people could at least hear the arguments 
for it.
38
 
2.33 Officials from the Northern Territory government did provide evidence of 
some recent attempts at public consultation,
39
 but the committee notes that this may 
not have provided the community with an adequate level of information, or enough 
time to consider a response. 
2.34 The Transport Workers Union also identified concerns regarding the lack of 
consultation around the sale of the Darwin bus service: 
This decision was made on the last day of parliamentary sittings, and was 
therefore met with limited parliamentary scrutiny. Public transport plays a 
                                              
33  Mr Peter Emery, Submission 14, P. 5; Emeritus Professor Bob Walker and Dr Betty Con 
Walker, Submission 30, p. 8; Australian Workers Union, Submission 32, p. 7. 
34  Northern Territory Opposition, Submission 33, p. 1; United Voice NT, Submission 27, p. 2. 
Ms Kay Densley, Northern Territory Regional Director, Community and Public Sector Union, 
Committee Hansard, 16 February 2015, p. 11.  
35  Northern Territory Opposition, Submission 33, pp 1–2. 
36  The Hon Delia Lawrie MLA, Leader of the Opposition in the Northern Territory, Committee 
Hansard, 16 February 2015, p. 1. 
37  United Voice NT, Submission 27, p. 2. 
38  Mr Gerry Wood MLA, Northern Territory Parliament, Committee Hansard, 16 February 2015, 
p. 37. 
39  Mr Richard Harding, Former CEO, Territory Insurance Office, Committee Hansard, 
16 February 2015, p. 50. 
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critical role in Northern Territory life. Every day, members of our 
community rely solely on a safe, cost-effective and efficient public 
transport system. There was no pre-election commitment to privatise the 
Darwin bus service. There was no meaningful consultation with the 
community, the union or employees over the decision to privatise the 
Darwin bus service.
40
 
2.35 Similar concerns have been raised about public consultation in relation to the 
proposed leasing of the Darwin Port.
41
 The committee notes that a Northern Territory 
parliamentary committee was established in relation to the leasing of the 
Darwin Port.
42
 
Disclosure of transaction and regulatory costs of privatisation 
2.36 The committee heard concerns relating to the disclosure of transaction and 
regulatory costs associated with privatisation. Mr Peter Emery submitted that in his 
view, transparency around the sale of state owned assets in South Australia had been 
insufficient to allow the community to make informed decisions about whether the 
privatisation was beneficial. He submitted that the degree of disclosure and detail of 
financial analysis and transactions entered into between the South Australian 
government, intermediaries and the buyers of assets had been very low, and that there 
was no significant detail on the public record.
 43
 
2.37 Some submitters raised concerns about the possible lack of disclosure of 
liabilities that are retained by governments when assets are privatised. Emeritus 
Professor Bob Walker and Dr Betty Con Walker submitted that in their view, the 
privatisation of the State Bank of NSW in 1995 did not properly account for risks 
relating to bad debts that were retained by the NSW government.
44
 The NSW Greens 
submitted that in their view, lack of disclosure of liabilities associated with the 50 year 
lease of the NSW desalination plant did not permit an open public debate on the 
lease.
45
 
2.38 Other potential costs are feasibility or scoping studies, cost-benefit analyses, 
corporate restructuring, and the structural separation of monopoly and competitive 
elements. Emeritus Professor Walker informed the committee that he estimates 
transactions costs are approximately six per cent of the transaction value, without 
including the cost of feasibility studies.
46
 
                                              
40  Ms Elise McLay, Northern Territory Organiser, Transport Workers Union, Committee 
Hansard, 16 February 2015, p. 11. 
41  Northern Territory Opposition, Submission 33, p. 2. 
42  Mr Gary Barnes, Coordinator-General of Major Projects and Investments, Northern Territory 
Government, Committee Hansard, 16 February 2015, p. 46. 
43  Mr Peter Emery, Submission 14, p. 5. 
44  Emeritus Professor Bob Walker and Dr Betty Con Walker, Submission 30, p. 13. 
45  NSW Greens, Submission 34, pp 5–6. 
46  Emeritus Professor Bob Walker, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 18 February 2015, 
p. 14. 
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2.39 The Northern Territory government noted that for relatively small projects, 
such as those that are likely to occur in less developed or regional and remote areas of 
Australia, a substantial amount of the Commonwealth contribution under the Assets 
Recycling Initiative would be likely to be consumed by the transaction costs 
associated with the privatisation process.
47
 
2.40 Some submitters suggested the cost of regulating privatised functions should 
be included when assessing the total costs of a privatisation. These costs could include 
the cost of establishing a relevant regulatory body, as well as the costs of compliance 
for the private entities involved. Mr David Richardson informed the committee that: 
…you are also going to need a good regulatory environment. That is a 
costly thing. If you look at Telstra, for example, the Commonwealth sold 
that but had already corporatised it and, having corporatised it, you then 
need to set up a regulatory structure. So now you have the position where 
you have an army of people in the ACCC regulating Telstra and you have 
an army of people in Telstra providing information to the ACCC. This is a 
crazy resource cost that is usually not factored in. In each state you have a 
similar thing. Now that the electricity authorities have been corporatised, 
we have a bureaucracy that monitors those state authorities, and they 
employ a significant number of people putting together facts and figures to 
satisfy the regulators.
48
 
2.41 In its report on Public Infrastructure the Productivity Commission noted that 
private sector involvement in infrastructure development and/or financing would only 
deliver efficiency gains with careful planning and implementation. Government 
guarantees and tax concessions still involve both risks and costs, and ultimately, it is 
the users and/or taxpayers who will absorb these.
49
 The transition to privatisation 
involves a range of activities, including effective communication with the community, 
which requires careful management and leadership.
50
 
The value of future earnings 
2.42 Submitters raised concerns about the disclosure of discount rates used to 
estimate the value of future earnings.
51
 The value of the potential sale relative to the 
future earnings of the entity to be privatised is an important consideration. The sale 
and the future earnings will happen in different timeframes, and adjustments should 
evaluate the possible changing value over time:  
This involves forecasting the future cash profits a business will generate, 
and discounting these back to the present day at the Weighted Average Cost 
                                              
47  Northern Territory Government, Submission 31, p. 2. 
48  Mr David Richardson, Senior Research Fellow, The Australia Institute, Committee Hansard, 
18 February 2015, pp 3–4. 
49  Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry report, No. 71, 27 May 2014, p. 2. 
50  Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry report, No. 71, May 2014, p. 2, 89. 
51  Mr Peter Emery, Submission 14, P. 6; Emeritus Professor Bob Walker and Dr Betty Con 
Walker, Submission 30, pp 13–14; 
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of Capital. The cash flows are discounted to reflect the time value of 
money, where $1 today is worth more than $1 tomorrow due to the returns 
that could be made by investing the $1.
52
 
2.43 Emeritus Professor Bob Walker and Dr Betty Con Walker submitted that in 
their view, the privatisation of the State Bank of NSW in 1995 led to a poor financial 
outcome for the State of NSW, with the sale price being a fraction of what the bank 
was worth. Central to this concern was the very high 18.9 per cent discount rate 
used.
53
  
Committee comment 
2.44 The committee is concerned about the possibility that incentives under the 
Asset Recycling Initiative may encourage privatisation without effective public 
consultation and communication strategies, and without appropriate consideration or 
analysis of future costs. The committee strongly encourages governments to conduct 
proper, rigorous analysis of the all current and future costs associated with 
privatisation projects. In addition, thorough and appropriate public consultation should 
be always be undertaken, including consultation around transactions costs and the cost 
of creating an appropriate regulatory environment and compliance with those 
arrangements. 
Recommendation 1 
2.45 The committee recommends that proper and rigorous analysis of total 
costs associated with privatisation projects be conducted when privatisation is 
proposed by governments at any level. In addition, appropriate public 
consultation should be undertaken, including consultation around transactions 
costs and the cost of creating an appropriate regulatory environment and 
compliance with those arrangements.  
 
  
                                              
52  Stephen Koukoulas and Thomas Devlin, The McKell Institute, Nothing to gain, plenty to lose: 
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electricity privatisation, December 2014, p. 53. 
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Public safeguards and the regulatory environment 
2.46 This section addresses concerns raised about public safeguards and regulatory 
arrangements.
54
 Submitters and witnesses identified the importance of ensuring that 
these were put in place before privatisation occurred, particularly in relation to natural 
monopolies.
55
 
2.47 The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) indicated 
that the benefits of privatisation could be at risk if actions to maximise the sale price 
limit competition or inhibit appropriate regulation. These concerns are increased 
where, in the case of the Asset Recycling Initiative, the Commonwealth proposes to 
provide incentive payments of 15 per cent of the sale proceeds.
56
 The ACCC indicated 
that: 
 it is important not only for competition reasons but also important for bidders 
in terms of ensuring certainty about the regulatory regime when they bid in 
the sale process; and 
 not having a mechanism that ensures appropriate up-front regulatory 
arrangements are reached may be distorting incentives.
57
 
2.48 The ACCC had previously raised concerns in its June 2014 submission to the 
government's competition policy review noting Australian governments are focusing 
on short term budget goals without sufficient regard to longer term competition. The 
ACCC indicated that anti-competitive provisions have been included in contracts 
between the states and potential acquirers that effectively impose a tax on future 
generations and hinder Australia’s competitiveness in the global market.58 
2.49 To highlight these concerns the ACCC provided the committee with the 
example of the right of first refusal that was provided to the acquirer of Sydney 
Airport to operate a second airport: 
The right of first refusal, along with certain provisions of the Airports Act 
1996, confers on the operator of Sydney Airport a potential monopoly over 
the supply of aeronautical services for international and most domestic 
flights in the Sydney Basin, with the real prospect that the potential for 
competition between Sydney Airport and an independent operator of a 
                                              
54  Emeritus Professor Bob Walker, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 18 February 2015, 
p. 14; ACCC, Submission 8, p. 3; Community and Public Sector Union, Submission 2, p. 2; 
Australian Services Union, Submission 15, pp 24–25; Business Council of Australia, 
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56  ACCC, Submission 8, p. 3. 
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58  ACCC, Submission 8, pp 5–6. 
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second airport will be foreclosed. Indeed, the National Audit Office has 
found that the sale price for Sydney Airport was higher than a number of 
possible valuation benchmarks, including the government’s own estimate of 
the sale price in the 2001-02 budget.
59 
2.50 The ACCC went on to recommend that: 
…the Commonwealth require the states and territories to demonstrate that 
appropriate market structure and/or access and pricing arrangements have 
been put in place as part of the privatisation process, and link this 
requirement to any payments made under the Commonwealth 
Government’s proposed incentive scheme for privatisations (the Asset 
Recycling Initiative).
60
 
2.51 This view was confirmed by the Productivity Commission, who emphasised 
the importance of addressing structural arrangements and regulation prior to 
privatisation, including separating natural monopoly components from competitive 
components. The Productivity Commission noted that: 
Structural separation can bring benefits because it can make it easier to 
achieve effective competition in those components where competition is 
possible. This is because a vertically-integrated firm with a monopoly over 
network infrastructure has an incentive to discriminate against competing 
firms that need to access this infrastructure. Regulating against such 
discrimination, for example in the telecommunications sector, can be 
difficult.
61
  
2.52 The Productivity Commission also suggested that the highest priority for the 
sale of government owned assets is not to secure the highest price, but to first ensure 
that: 
 economic efficiency is achieved; 
 the risks to consumers and other public interests are managed; 
 the market structure is amenable to the privatisation; and 
 the sale is conducted efficiently, ethically and transparently.
62
 
2.53 The Business Council of Australia (BCA) supported introducing appropriate 
pricing and access arrangements prior to privatisation, even if those arrangements may 
reduce the sale price of the asset.
63
 The BCA submitted that: 
These regulatory arrangements will enable potential investors to have a 
clear understanding of the terms under which the asset will be permitted to 
operate, and should allow customers to raise any issues or concerns they 
                                              
59  ACCC, Submission 8, pp 5–6. 
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may have. It minimises the risk of pressure for post-sale regulation in 
subsequent years that, in turn, would undermine the confidence of investors 
and their willingness to invest in growing these businesses.
64
 
2.54 Treasury indicated that in its view, states and territories are accountable to 
their constituents for ensuring that the necessary regulatory arrangements are in place. 
Treasury also submitted that the Commonwealth respects the role of the states and 
territories to make decisions about appropriate regulatory arrangements within their 
jurisdiction.65 
2.55 The committee did not receive much evidence on parliamentary scrutiny of 
privatisation. However, the Northern Territory government submitted that in its view, 
the current levels of parliamentary scrutiny and other regulatory and legislative 
safeguards are sufficient to ensure an appropriate balance between maintaining the 
long term interests of the public and allowing sufficient flexibility in achieving the 
best outcomes for investment in new economic infrastructure.
66 
Committee comment 
2.56 The committee considers that appropriate safeguards and regulatory 
arrangements should be put in place for all asset privatisation, well in advance of the 
sale process commencing. The committee is concerned about the evidence it has 
received that the Asset Recycling Initiative may encourage states and territories to 
take shortcuts on safeguards and regulatory arrangements in order to meet the 
timeframes established by the Asset Recycling Initiative. 
Recommendation 2 
2.57 The committee recommends that prior to privatisation of assets, 
governments at all levels introduce appropriate regulatory arrangements and 
safeguards, including safeguards against anti-competitive behaviour to ensure 
that future costs are known and established. 
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Inequity of the initiative across states and territories 
2.58 This section discusses the committee's consideration of the possible inequity 
of the Asset Recycling Initiative across states and territories. Binding infrastructure 
funding to privatisation may lead to unfairness and inequity across states and 
territories because it: 
 disadvantages those jurisdictions that have already undertaken significant 
privatisations; 
 operates on a 'first in first served' basis, benefiting those jurisdictions with 
assets to sell or prepared for sale, rather than those jurisdictions most in need 
of infrastructure funding; and 
 the fixed 15 per cent incentive does not correlate to infrastructure need and 
may be substantially consumed by transaction costs for small projects in small 
jurisdictions. 
2.59 The section also notes that steps have been taken to minimise the impact of 
the Asset Recycling Initiative on the distribution of GST proceeds. 
Some jurisdictions are disadvantaged 
2.60 Several submitters and witnesses reminded the committee that those states and 
territories which have already undertaken significant privatisation activities may be 
disadvantaged by the Asset Recycling Initiative.
67
 
2.61 Some raised concerns about the 'first in first served' nature of the Initiative.68 
The Northern Territory government submitted that:  
…some jurisdictions appear to be at a much more advanced stage of 
preparation for asset sales and have a large pipeline of potential 
privatisations. It is foreseeable that the existing pipeline of privatisations in 
the larger jurisdictions may significantly eat into the pool of funds allocated 
for incentive payments under the asset recycling initiative.
69
 
2.62 The Business Council of Australia suggested that the Asset Recycling 
Initiative should be designed to prevent one or two states from capturing all of the 
available $5 billion in funding through large-scale privatisation projects.
70
 
2.63 Emeritus Professor Bob Walker and Dr Betty Con Walker also suggested that 
incentives for privatisation from the Commonwealth may encourage states and 
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territories to sell their most profitable businesses, which are currently providing 
essential services.
71
 
Fifteen per cent incentive 
2.64 The committee heard several concerns about the seemingly arbitrary and fixed 
15 per cent figure of the Asset Recycling Initiative, and assertions that it may not be a 
sufficient incentive for some new infrastructure projects.
72
 Both the Northern 
Territory government and Northern Territory opposition shared this concern.
73
 The 
Northern Territory government submitted that:  
There is also inequity in the size of potential Commonwealth contributions 
due to the fixed 15 per cent contribution rate. As previously noted, a flat 
rate of 15 per cent represents a significant contribution for larger projects. 
However, for relatively small projects (under $200 million) such as those 
that are likely to occur in less developed or regional and remote areas of 
Australia, a substantial amount of the Commonwealth contribution may be 
offset by transaction costs.
74
 
2.65 Treasury confirmed that the figure of 15 per cent was not a result of economic 
modelling, but of negotiation between the Commonwealth (seeking to achieve the 
lowest percentage possible) and the states and territories (seeking to achieve the 
highest percentage possible).
75
 
Impact on GST redistribution 
2.66 The committee notes that the Asset Recycling Initiative does acknowledge 
inequities between the states and territories by exempting the Initiative payments from 
the GST redistribution treatment undertaken by the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission: 
If the incentive payments were not fully exempt, an incentive payment to a 
state or territory would have also resulted in a decreased GST allocation for 
that jurisdiction over time. The net effect of this would have been to 
reallocate any incentive payment made across all states and territories 
according to their respective population shares, irrespective of their 
commitment to recycle capital into additional infrastructure. This would 
have greatly diminished the incentive effect of the payments.
76
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Committee comment on the Asset Recycling Initiative 
2.67 The committee has considered a wide range of evidence on the Asset 
Recycling Initiative and in particular, evidence on the link that the Initiative creates 
between privatisation and investment in infrastructure.  
2.68 The committee notes that in its inquiry into Pubic Infrastructure, the 
Productivity Commission considered the Asset Recycling Initiative and concluded 
that on balance: 
 the aims of the Asset Recycling Initiative are laudable, but the risks are 
significant; 
 decisions to privatise a state owned asset and procure new infrastructure 
should be seperate;  
 there is a distinct risk that states and territories will take shortcuts to avoid 
thorough and transparent analysis; and 
 governments should avoid creating expectations in the community that 
privatisation is only acceptable when the proceeds are used for procuring new 
infrastructure, constraining future governments from optimising their balance 
sheets in the public interest.
 77
 
2.69 The committee is very concerned that binding privatisation with investment in 
infrastructure may lead to several significant problems including: 
 potentially distorting decisions by states and territories on infrastructure 
investment, leading to projects being pursued that would not stand on their 
own merits; 
 potentially distorting decisions leading to privatisation that would not go 
ahead if they were considered on a case-by-case basis; 
 the possibility that privatisation and infrastructure projects will be rushed 
without:  
 appropriate public consultation and debate leading to poor outcomes; 
and  
 appropriate safeguards, corporate structures and regulatory arrangements 
in place; and 
 the potential to create inequitable outcomes between states and territories as 
the Initiative may unfairly benefit those jurisdictions which currently have 
assets for sale or prepared for sale, rather than those jurisdictions where the 
infrastructure is most needed. 
2.70 For the reasons set out above the link between privatisation and infrastructure 
funding under the Asset Recycling Initiative should be removed. This would provide 
an environment where states and territories consider the merits of privatisation on a 
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case by case basis and fund infrastructure projects based on community and economic 
need. The Commonwealth should contribute funding based on the merits of proposed 
projects while considering the equitable distribution of funds across states and 
territories. 
Recommendation 3 
2.71 The committee recommends that the link between privatisation of assets 
and infrastructure funding under the Asset Recycling Initiative should be 
removed. This would provide an environment where:  
 states and territories are encouraged to consider the merits of 
privatisation on a case by case basis; 
 decisions to fund infrastructure projects are based on the community and 
economic need; and 
 the Commonwealth contributes funding based on the merits of proposed 
infrastructure projects while considering the equitable distribution of 
funds across states and territories. 
 
 
 
 
Senator Sam Dastyari 
Chair 
  
Dissenting Report by Government Senators 
1.1 While the majority report of the Committee contains some informative 
discussion of some elements of the Commonwealth Government’s Asset Recycling 
Initiative, it provides an unbalanced presentation of the evidence and arguments 
received during the course of the inquiry. A number of the issues raised by 
participants to the inquiry highlight some of the benefits of the Government’s asset 
recycling policy as well as evidence on the wider benefits from infrastructure 
privatisation were not considered or only received limited attention. This imbalance 
has resulted in recommendations of the majority report that are either unnecessary — 
as they call for processes or actions for which there are already established 
mechanisms within governments — or misguided, and hence cannot be supported. 
Importance of Infrastructure to Economic Growth 
1.2 Spending on productivity enhancing infrastructure is one of the keys to 
economic growth and prosperity. The Government is responding to the needs of the 
economy by building infrastructure that will drive economic growth, create jobs and 
improve productivity:  
1.3 A core element of the Government’s Economic Action Strategy is the 
commitment of an additional $11.6 billion for the Infrastructure Growth Package. Part 
of the 2014–15 Budget, the Growth Package delivered $5 billion for the Asset 
Recycling Initiative, $3.7 billion to boost infrastructure investments to expenditure 
projects and $2.9 billion for the Western Sydney Infrastructure Plan. The 
Commonwealth’s total investment in infrastructure through to 2019–20 will be around 
$50 billion.  
1.4 This investment will generate significant additional state and private sector 
participation to build the infrastructure that Australia needs and will transform 
infrastructure across the country to lay the foundations for future growth. When the 
construction projects supported by the Government’s infrastructure initiatives are 
completed, they will add around 1 percentage point to GDP.   
Asset Recycling Initiative  
1.5 The Asset Recycling Initiative is designed to provide incentives to States and 
Territories to realise existing assets (sale or lease) and invest the proceeds in new, 
productivity enhancing infrastructure. This ‘recycling’ frees money currently locked 
up to help fund the projects that the States and Territories consider important to their 
future economic prosperity. The Initiative taps into private sector investment interest 
in current assets in order to fund new infrastructure. 
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1.6 The Commonwealth will provide incentive payments to the States and 
Territories of 15 per cent of the sale price of assets, but only on the condition that 
proceeds are reinvested in productivity enhancing assets. The initiative is estimated to 
support up to $38 billion in new infrastructure spending according to the Department 
of Infrastructure and Regional Development.1 
1.7 The first Asset Recycling Initiative agreement was signed with the Labor 
Government of the ACT on 19 February 2015 – around $60 million in incentive 
payments following the ACT’s decision to sell ACTTAB along with some property 
assets. 
1.8 On 8 March 2015 the Commonwealth Government announced $2 billion in 
incentive payments for crucial infrastructure projects in conjunction with the NSW 
State Government.2 
Privatisations under previous governments 
1.9 In addition to placing heavy reliance on the views of union witnesses, the 
committee majority has placed a very heavy reliance in their report on testimony from 
Mr Stephen Koukoulas, quoting him at length. Mr Kouloulas was an economic 
adviser to the former Labor Government, serving as Senior Economic Adviser to 
Prime Minister Julia Gillard from September 2010 to July 2011.3 It is not very 
convincing for the Labor majority to place heavy reliance on the opinions of a former 
Federal Labor adviser in support of the Federal Labor prejudice against privatisation. 
1.10 The former Labor Government presided over a period when privatisations at a 
federal level were dormant, because of the economic prejudices of that Government. 
The former Hawke and Keating Labor Governments were far more reformist and 
modern in their outlook, undertaking a series of privatisations across different points 
in the economic cycle (see Table 1 below). In contrast to the Rudd/Gillard/Rudd 
Labor Government’s record, state Labor governments have also pursued a number of 
privatisations including several that straddled the same period (see Table 2 below). 
  
1  Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, The Asset Recycling Initiative, 
http://investment.infrastructure.gov.au/publications/reports/pdf/factsheets2014/Factsheet_The_
Asset_Recycling_Initiative.pdf, (accessed 5 March 2015). 
2  The Hon Joe Hockey MP, Media release, $2 billion Asset Recycling deal to rebuild NSW, 
http://jbh.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/016-2015/, (accessed 18 March 2015). 
3  Stephen Koukoulas, http://www.marketeconomics.com.au/stephen-koukoulas, (accessed 
18 March 2015). 
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Table 1: Commonwealth Privatisations under Labor 
Commonwealth Privatisations under Labor  Sale Proceeds ($m) Government 
April 1988 
Commonwealth Accommodation and Catering 
Services  
14.9 Hawke 
November 1988 
Defence Service House Corporation Loan 
Portfolio  
1,515 Hawke 
May 1991 
Australian Defence Force Home Loan Franchise  
42 Hawke 
June 1991 
Commonwealth Housing Loan Assistance 
Schemes in the ACT  
47.3 Hawke 
September 1992 
Australian Airlines  
400 Keating 
March 1993 
25% of Qantas 
665 Keating 
October 1993 
Commonwealth Bank Secondary Public Share 
Offer 
1,700 Keating 
November 1993 
Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation 
1.5 Keating 
June 1994 
Moomba-Sydney Pipeline System 
534 Keating 
June 1994 
CSL (former Commonwealth Serum 
Laboratories) Public Share Offer 
300 Keating 
June 1994 
Commonwealth Uranium Stockpile 
57 Keating 
June 1995 
Aerospace Technologies of Australia Pty Ltd  
40 Keating 
July 1995 
Qantas Public Share Offer 
1,400 Keating 
 
  
 
Page 30  
Table 2: Privatisations under state Labor governments 
 
Year State Asset Price ($m) Government  
1994 Queensland Gladstone Power 
Station 
750 Goss (ALP) 
1997 NSW NSW TAB 936 Carr (ALP) 
1999 Queensland  Queensland TAB 268 Beattie (ALP) 
2006 NSW DirectLink 170 Iemma (ALP) 
2006 Queensland Allgas Energy 535 Beattie/Bligh 
(ALP) 
2006 Queensland Sun Retail 1,202 Beattie/Bligh 
(ALP) 
2007 Queensland Powerdirect 1,200 Beattie/Bligh 
(ALP) 
2010 Queensland QR National 66% 
sale 
4,050 Bligh (ALP) 
2010 NSW NSW Lotteries 1011 Rees/Keneally 
(ALP) 
2010 NSW First tranche of 
electricity assets 
5,300 Keneally (ALP) 
 
Income substitution effects 
1.11 In their report, the committee majority claims that privatisation of an income 
producing business would cause a state or territory government to lose dividend 
streams, as well as tax equivalent payments under the National Tax Equivalence 
Regime.  
1.12 This argument simply ignores that the cessation of future dividend flows 
would be compensated through capital proceeds from sale (which implicitly recognise 
long-run income producing potential, net of holding costs and other factors affecting 
the value of the business in question).  
1.13 It also ignores the fact that direct dividends to taxpayers through a state or 
territory government would be replaced in future with corporate income tax and 
income tax from resident shareholders who receive dividend streams. While these tax 
streams would flow to the Commonwealth following privatisation, the 15 per cent 
incentive provides an up-front incentive to partly recognise the movement of benefits 
between tiers of government. Far from the incentive “distorting” decisions, as the 
majority contend, it helps make the decisions stand more clearly on their merits by 
removing a current disincentive to privatisation. 
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1.14 Government Business Enterprises face inherent difficulties in doing their job 
well and it is these problems that have impelled governments to increasingly look at 
alternative forms of delivery, such as privatisation. 
1.15 Government run business operations have found it increasingly difficult to 
obtain funding injections from Government because they have to compete against 
other high priority pressures for taxpayer spending. As a result Government Business 
Enterprises can be prevented from or hamstrung in the extent to which they can 
upgrade new plant and equipment or invest in business innovation or re-engineering 
(eg: modern IT or improved business processes). As a result, while these business 
operations are in public hands, the value creating capacity of these operations can be 
constrained. Private operators in practice have better flexibility to access capital and 
improve business efficiency and output. This means that private control and 
investment can also maximise the profitability of such business operations and the tax 
yield which flows back into public hands.  
Evidence about specific privatisations 
1.16 The committee majority has placed an unusual level of reliance on examples 
from the Northern Territory, citing testimony from the Northern Territory Labor Party 
and trade union officials. Curiously the committee has not taken any interest in the 
privatisation proposals announced by the Australian Capital Territory. The ACT 
Labor Government became the first administration to sign up to a privatisation 
program under the Australian Government’s Asset Recycling Initiative.  
1.17 The committee majority also ignored the recent Medibank Private sale, which 
is an exemplary case of a privatisation done well and is a key part of the Asset 
Recycling Initiative. This is one of the largest floats in Australian history. This sale 
provides $5.679 billion in proceeds that will be re-invested into productivity 
enhancing infrastructure through the Government’s Asset Recycling Initiative. 
1.18 The committee majority has floated some short-sighted testimony from 
particular opponents of privatisation. Mr David Richardson of the left-wing Australia 
Institute argued that privatisation sometimes requires an investment by taxpayers in 
improving the regulatory oversight of an industry, where previously there was 
inadequate supervision to protect consumer interests. This view overlooks the fact that 
continued public ownership of a business operation can place the Government in a 
conflicted position, as both regulator and provider of services. That conflict can work 
against the interests of consumers and business. The desirability of sound regulation 
does not disappear where a Government operator is a participant in the market. 
1.19 The committee majority contradicts itself where it subsequently stresses the 
importance of good regulation, to ensure fairness in competition and to give certainty 
to the operators in a market ahead of privatisation. The arguments for good regulation 
and for safeguards against anti-competitive behaviour are not exclusively applicable to 
privatisation, but equally well apply to Government monopolies. 
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Impacts of infrastructure privatisation on consumers and capital productivity 
1.20 An unfortunate result of the majority report’s selective use of evidence is that 
considerable relevant information and evidence available was ignored or received 
limited consideration. For example, there is substantial evidence that privatisation of 
infrastructure tends to lead to reduced prices to consumers and more productive use of 
infrastructure assets. The improved outcomes in terms of prices are likely to reflect 
several factors. Governments that own infrastructure face mixed incentives, 
particularly as higher prices can assist with budget bottom lines. Privatised operations 
generally face higher incentives for efficiency. This has been confirmed in a number 
of studies, including several released during the final months of the inquiry. 
• A report by Ernst and Young, prepared for Infrastructure Partnerships 
Australia concluded that in privatised networks businesses generally operate 
more efficiently, resulting in lower price increases.4 These results were 
achieved without compromising service standards, and applied across both 
urban and rural customers. 
• An Australian Industry (AI) Group report released in January concluded 
overinvestment in the network over time had substantially increased the 
state’s electricity prices.5 The report found that Queensland’s electricity prices 
could be expected to fall substantially if power companies were privatised. 
Another benefit of privatisation identified in the report was the capacity to 
free up capital for reinvestment. 
• A report by CME commissioned by UnitingCare on electricity prices released 
in February 2015 showed how costs to Victorian consumers, specifically 
network charges, were about half those in the Queensland and NSW level.6 
Further, the privatised Victorian system has seen network charges also 
increased at a lower rate. 
• Analysis by Tony Wood of the Grattan Institute released in March 2015 
addressing the anti-privatisation campaign in New South Wales noted the 
benefits of privatisation in terms of electricity prices to consumers.7 A detailed 
comparison between government and private ownership, published in the 
Grattan Institute’s 2012 report found that government-owned companies had 
more physical infrastructure per customer and spent more on capital 
investment than did privately owned companies.8 
4  Ernst and Young Australia, Network Pricing Trends, Queensland Perspective, January, 2015. 
5  Australian Industry Group,  AI Group Statement, January 2015 
6  UnitingCare Australia, Network tariffs applicable to households in Australia: empirical 
evidence, Report prepared for UnitingCare Australia by Carbon and Energy Markets, February 
2015. 
7  Wood, T., NSW power privatisation: Stop the Sell Off claims put to the test, The Conversation, 
10 March 2015. 
8  Wood, T., Putting the customer back in front: How to make electricity cheaper, Grattan 
Institute, December, 2012. 
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Process for privatisation 
1.21 The committee has recommended that any privatisation be based upon 
rigorous analysis of all costs and be preceded by public consultation. This is precisely 
what governments ordinarily do as part of considering any option for privatisation. 
The Commonwealth for example conducts scoping studies, as a means of identifying 
the most effective approach to deliver a service. Such exercises do not proceed from a 
bias towards privatisation, rather they are exercises aimed at identifying the best 
delivery method for a service to the community. A scoping study may for instance 
recommend better regulation, greater competition, or restructuring of government 
delivery mechanisms. 
1.22 A scoping study is traditionally run by department officials and informed by 
independent advice from business advisers and legal advisers who have the expertise 
to assess the relevant service and market in fine detail. This work is done at arms 
length from Ministers and at arms length from those who currently have vested 
interests in the market. 
1.23 These studies usually involve extensive consultation, including with consumer 
groups, current providers and potential future providers (including institutional 
investors). There is nothing new or profound in what the committee majority is 
recommending. 
Arguments against the Asset Recycling Initiative 
1.24 Some of the criticisms of the Asset Recycling Initiative are not particularly 
convincing. Plainly the measure is aimed at encouraging future investment in new 
infrastructure, but some critics complain that this does not benefit jurisdictions which 
have undertaken past privatisations. This criticism is not contending that the initiative 
is innately undesirable, but that it isn’t as available as widely as possible. The 
complaint however shows poor understanding of sound public policy principles. It is 
normal for any incentive scheme to operate prospectively, where the policy intention 
is to encourage activity which might not otherwise occur.  
1.25 Other critics worry that a ‘first come first served’ model might disadvantage 
late comers. Again this is a criticism that a desirable scheme it isn’t as available as 
widely as possible. As we live in a world of finite resources, it is not possible to have 
an open-ended scheme. Given that the Government has made very clear up front how 
decisions would be taken, all states and territories begin with the same opportunity to 
put forward their best cases early. 
1.26 The criticism that 15 per cent is not as much as some would like, is another 
concession that the scheme is intrinsically a desirable one. As the figure was 
negotiated between the Commonwealth and the states and territories, this figure 
strikes the right balance to provide a sufficient incentive to unleash locked-up capital. 
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1.27 Some of the criticism is entirely speculative and counter-intuitive. The 
majority assert that “there is a distinct risk that states and territories will take shortcuts 
to avoid thorough and transparent analysis.” In fact, in a competitive scheme, states 
and territories will be under pressure to present the most convincing analysis. 
Moreover public interest in privatisations will compel governments to be transparent. 
Governments are always conscious that if they fail to be sufficiently transparent, they 
can be held accountable through the democratic process. 
1.28 Several participants to the inquiry highlighted the benefits that asset recycling 
can provide governments. For example, the Australian Logistics Council stated that 
one of the benefits of asset recycling is its capacity to provide governments with 
constrained balance sheets the ability to unlock capital tied up in mature assets. It also 
stated that the idea was by no means novel, noting: 
For instance, the Infrastructure Finance Working Group (established by the 
previous government in 2011 to provide advice to Infrastructure Australia 
on infrastructure finance policy) recommended State and Territory 
governments conduct strategic reviews of ‘brownfield assets’ to: identify 
and monetise suitable candidates so as to allow the freed up capital and 
[allow for] avoided debt repayments to be recycled/invested into 
infrastructure projects. 
…the budgets of most Australian governments are likely to be in deficit for 
the foreseeable future, and likely to remain so, with growing demand for 
recurrent spending on health, education, NDIS etc. It is therefore necessary 
to identify alternative funding sources for the roads and infrastructure 
hitherto regarded as public goods funded from consolidated revenue.9 
1.29 Finally, the quotation and paraphrasing of the discussion in the Productivity 
Commission inquiry into Public Infrastructure on asset recycling in the majority report 
(paragraph 2.68), while noting the Commission’s concerns about risks, omitted to 
include the Commission’s concluding paragraph which noted:  
[T]he Initiative does not obviate the need for good governance and 
transparent and sound analysis of privatisation and procurement decisions. 
Only under these constraints can the additional risks of the initiative be 
managed in a way that preserves the interests of the broader community.10 
1.30 As noted above, Government accepts that rigorous analysis of costs and 
benefits as well as sound decision making processes are necessary to protect the 
interests of the wider community. 
  
9  Australian Logistics Council, Submission 12, p. 4. 
10  Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry report, No. 71, May 2014, p. 264. 
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Comments on recommendations 
1.31 Response to recommendation 1. This recommendation calling for good 
processes prior to privatisation decisions, including a full assessment of the costs of 
projects as well as extensive consultation, is consistent with the Government’s 
proposed policy that the full costs of any privatisation and investment projects as well 
as an assessment of the benefits should be undertaken, before decisions are made to 
proceed. It is noted, however, that primary responsibility for this lies with State and 
Territory Governments. 
1.32 Response to recommendation 2. The introduction of appropriate regulatory 
arrangements and safeguards against anti-competitive behaviour are important 
considerations for governments undertaking privatisation. These are, however, matters 
for the responsible State and Territory Governments. 
1.33 Response to recommendation 3.  For the reasons outlined in the preceding 
discussion, this recommendation is not supported. 
 
 
 
 
Senator Sean Edwards    Senator Matthew Canavan  
Deputy Chair     Committee Member 
 
  
Additional Comments by the Australian Greens 
 
1.1 The Australian Greens believe that public assets should remain in public 
hands unless there is a very compelling case for them to be sold. This senate inquiry 
into the privatisation of state and territory assets and new infrastructure has elicited 
important evidence demonstrating that selling public assets presents significant risks 
to the public interest, and that it is not a way to solve revenue problems. 
1.2 The committee report is an excellent summary of the risks and issues involved 
when infrastructure funding is linked to privatisation. It is a clear exposition of the 
safeguards and accountability measures required when privatisation is considered. The 
evidence provided shows that is it vital to protect the public interest from sell-offs, 
which lead to higher prices, job cuts, attacks on workers’ pay and conditions, 
declining services, and reduced revenue to state governments. 
1.3 The Greens have opposed the government’s Asset Recycling Initiative as an 
incentive to privatise assets. We believe that bribing financially stretched State 
Governments to sell assets in return for funding expensive urban freeways and tunnels 
shows a poverty of vision when it comes to funding for new infrastructure. 
1.4 The Abbott government’s Asset Recycling scheme is designed to push state 
and territory governments to privatise their public assets. ‘Asset recycling’ involves 
15 per cent "bonus" payments to state governments that sell public assets and use that 
money to pay for so-called new infrastructure — mainly big privatised road projects. 
The report includes evidence that this 15 per cent incentive figure was determined not 
through any kind of economic analysis or analysis of loss of revenues associated with 
asset sales, rather it was decided upon as an apparently arbitrary figure following 
negotiations between the Commonwealth and state and territory governments.1 
1.5 The Greens echo the contributions of several witnesses recorded in the report, 
who provided evidence for seeking alternative funding mechanisms for infrastructure. 
We agree with the evidence of Mr Stephen Koukoulas who observed that, if it is 
worthwhile undertaking public infrastructure spending, it should be done regardless of 
whether there is asset recycling, and that it should be based on need and not any other 
incentive.2 
1.6 While we support the overall intentions of the recommendations contained in 
the report, the Australian Greens feel that stronger emphasis needs to be placed in 
order to take into account the issues noted in these comments. We propose the 
following revisions to the report’s recommendations. 
 
1  Mr Chris Legg, Chief Adviser, Industries and Infrastructure Division, Department of the 
Treasury, Committee Hansard, 20 February 2015, p. 42. 
2  Mr Stephen Koukoulas, Managing Director, Market Economics, Committee Hansard, 
18 February 2015, pp 8–11. 
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Recommendation 1 
1.7 The Australian Greens recommend that proper and rigorous analysis of 
total costs and projected benefits associated with privatisation projects be 
conducted when privatisation is proposed by governments at any level. 
Appropriate public consultation should be undertaken as part of this analysis, 
including consultation around transactions costs, the cost of creating an 
appropriate regulatory environment and compliance with those arrangements, 
the value of foregone income from state owned assets and appropriate discount 
rates to be applied to financial analysis.  
Recommendation 2 
1.8 The Australian Greens recommend that prior to proposed privatisation 
of assets, governments at all levels introduce appropriate regulatory 
arrangements and safeguards, including safeguards against anti-competitive 
behaviour to ensure that future costs are known and established; and 
mechanisms to ensure transparency of operations of the privatised entity.  
Recommendation 3  
1.9 The Australian Greens recommend that the 15 per cent funding to states 
under the Asset Recycling Initiative should be abolished. Decisions to fund 
infrastructure projects should be based on the community and economic need. 
The Commonwealth should contribute funding based on the merits of proposed 
infrastructure projects while considering the equitable distribution of funds 
across states and territories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Senator Janet Rice 
Australian Greens 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
APPENDIX 1 
Submissions received 
 
Submission 
Number  Submitter 
1. The Hon Tom Koutsantonis MP 
2. Community and Public Sector Union 
3. Name Withheld 
4. Queensland Nurses' Union 
5. Mr Brian Collingburn 
6. Consult Australia 
7. Professionals Australia 
8. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
9. The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia 
10. Water Services Association of Australia 
11. Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 
12. Australian Logistics Council 
13. Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
14. Mr Peter Emery 
15. Australian Services Union 
16. Arid Lands Environment Centre 
17. The Australia Institute 
18. Australian Sugar Industry Alliance 
19. Electrical Trades Union 
20. Electrical Trades Union NSW Branch 
21. Professor John Quiggin 
22. Business Council of Australia 
23. Stop the Sell Off 
24. Health Services Union 
25. Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia 
26. NSW Nurses and Midwives' Association 
27. United Voice Northern Territory Branch 
28. Treasury 
29. Unions NSW 
30. Emeritus Professor Bob Walker and Dr Betty Con Walker 
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31. Northern Territory Government 
32. Australian Workers Union 
33. Northern Territory Opposition 
34. Greens NSW 
35. Collieries’ Staff and Officials Association 
36. Maritime Union of Australia 
37. Australian Horticultural Exporters Association 
 
 
Answers to questions on notice 
 
1. Answer to question on notice asked at a public hearing on 18 February 2015, received 
from Treasury on 18 March 2015. 
2. Answer to written question on notice sent on 20 February 2015, received from 
Treasury on 18 March 2015. 
 
  
 
APPENDIX 2 
Public hearings and witnesses 
 
DARWIN, 16 FEBRUARY 2015 
BARNES, Mr Gary, Coordinator-General of Major Projects and Investments 
COCKING, Mr Jimmy, Director, Arid Lands Environment Centre  
DENSLEY, Ms Kay, Northern Territory Regional Director, Community and Public 
Sector Union  
EARLY, Ms Erina, Acting Branch Secretary, United Voice NT  
HARDING, Mr Richard, Former CEO, Territory Insurance Office  
HOWARD, Ms Penny, Research Officer, Maritime Union of Australia  
KIRBY, Mr Paul, Organiser, Electrical Trades Union (Northern Territory Branch)  
LAWRIE, the Hon Delia MLA, Member for Karama, Leader of the Opposition in the 
Northern Territory 
MAYOR, Mr Thomas, Secretary, Northern Territory Branch, Maritime Union of 
Australia  
McLAY, Ms Elise, Northern Territory Organiser, Transport Workers Union  
PETERS, Ms Sonia, Office of the Leader of the Opposition in the Northern Territory  
RYAN, Ms Jodie, Under Treasurer, Northern Territory Department of Treasury and 
Finance 
TILBROOK, Mr Phil, President, Prison Officers Association NT  
WOOD, Mr Gerry, Member for Nelson, Northern Territory Parliament 
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SYDNEY, 18 FEBRUARY 2015 
BALI, Mr Stephen, Assistant Secretary, NSW Branch, Australian Workers' Union  
BOLGER, Ms Catherine, Director, Collieries’ Staff and Officials Association; and 
Director, Professionals Australia  
BUTLER, Mr Steve, Secretary, NSW Branch, Electrical Trades Union of Australia  
COSGRAVE, Mr Michael, Executive General Manager, Infrastructure Regulation 
Division, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
HAYES, Mr Gerard, Secretary, NSW Branch, Health Services Union  
HOLMES, Mr Brett, General Secretary, NSW Nurses and Midwives’ Association  
HOWARD, Dr Penny, National Research Officer, National Office, Maritime Union of 
Australia 
KERSLAKE, Mr Adam, Director, Stop the Sell Off campaign  
KOUKOULAS, Mr Stephen, Managing Director, Market Economics  
LEGG, Mr Chris, Chief Adviser, Industries and Infrastructure Division, Department 
of the Treasury  
LENNON, Mr Mark, Secretary, Unions NSW  
McCALLUM, Mr Lance, National Policy Officer, Electrical Trades Union  
McLEAN, Mr Greg, Assistant National Secretary, and Head, Public Services 
Division, Australian Services Union  
POWELL, Mr Steven, Analyst, Department of the Treasury 
QUIGGIN, Professor John, Australian Research Council Laureate Fellow, University 
of Queensland  
RICHARDSON, Mr David, Senior Research Fellow, The Australia Institute 
SHEPPARD, Ms Sarah, Director, Regulated Access—Rail, Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission 
WALKER, Dr Betty Con, Private Capacity  
WALKER, Professor Bob, Private Capacity  
